These remarks preface two volumes consisting of the proceedings of the Third International Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science. The conference was held under the auspices of the Union, The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science. The meetings took place in Montreal, Canada, 25-29 August 1980, with Concordia University as host institution. The program of the conference (...) was arranged by a Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science consisting of Robert E. Butts (Canada), John Murdoch (U. S. A. ), Vladimir Kirsanov (U. S. S. R. ), and Paul Weingartner (Austria). The Local Arrangements Committee consisted of Stanley G. French, Chair (Concordia), Michel Paradis, treasurer (McGill), Fran~ois Duchesneau (Universite de Montreal), Robert Nadeau (Universite du Quebec it Montreal), and William Shea (McGill University). Both committees are indebted to Dr. G. R. Paterson, then President of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science, who shared his expertise in many ways. Dr. French and his staff worked diligently and efficiently on behalf of all participants. The city of Montreal was, as always, the subtle mixture of extravagance, charm, warmth and excitement that retains her status as the jewel of Canadian cities. The funding of major international conferences is always a problem. (shrink)

Radical ecology typically brings to mind media images of ecological activists standing before loggers' saws, staging anti-nuclear marches, and confronting polluters on the high seas. Yet for more than twenty years, the activities of organizations such as the Greens and Earth First! have been influenced by a diverse, less-publicized group of radical ecological philosophers. It is their work—the philosophical underpinnings of the radical ecological movement—that is the subject of _Contesting Earth's Future_. The book offers a much-needed, balanced appraisal of radical (...) ecology's principles, goals, and limitations. Michael Zimmerman critically examines the movement's three major branches—deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism. He also situates radical ecology within the complex cultural and political terrain of the late twentieth century, showing its relation to Martin Heidegger's anti-technological thought, 1960s counterculturalism, and contemporary theories of poststructuralism and postmodernity. An early and influential ecological thinker, Zimmerman is uniquely qualified to provide a broad overview of radical environmentalism and delineate its various schools of thought. He clearly describes their defining arguments and internecine disputes, among them the charge that deep ecology is an anti-modern, proto-fascist ideology. Reflecting both the movement's promise and its dangers, this book is essential reading for all those concerned with the worldwide ecological crisis. (shrink)

Over the past five years the authors have been working in Detroit with grassroots coalitions resisting emergency management. In this essay, we explore how community groups in Detroit and Flint have advanced common struggles for clean, safe, affordable water as a human right, offering an account of activism that has directly confronted neoliberalism across the state. We analyze how solidarity has been forged through community organizing, interventions into mainstream media portrayals of the water crises, and the articulation of counternarratives that (...) center the experiences, needs, and collective power of those most directly affected. While our rootedness in Detroit leads us to focus primarily on the experiences of activists based there rather than in Flint, we insist throughout that the experiences, resistance, and aspirations of these communities are best understood as interconnected and mutually empowering. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Précis of Michael E. Bratman, Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. The planning theory highlights our capacity to settle on future courses of action in ways that Philosophy Department, shape on-going thought and action. Given our resource limits, our prior plans exhibit a characteristic partiality. Given this partiality, pressures for means-end coherence lead to problems of means. In solving these problems, one is constrained by pressures of consistency and intention stability, pressures that induce a filter of (...) admissibility on solutions. Such plan-infused functioning involves guidance of practical thinking by norms of intention rationality, including norms of consistency, agglomerativity, means-end coherence, and stability over time. These essays focus on questions about the nature of and support for these norms. The essays aim to incorporate but go beyond a two-tier pragmatic rationale for these norms. They seek a view between a skeptical ‘myth theory’ and a cognitivist view that sees these norms as a matter of theoretical rationality. The essays argue that these norms track conditions of a planning agent’s self-governance, both at a time and over time; and the essays explain the reflective significance of this tracking in part by appeal to our entrenched, though contingent, end of our diachronic self-governance. (shrink)

Recent disclosures regarding the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and his own version of National Socialism have led me to rethink my earlier efforts to portray Heidegger as a forerunner of deep ecology. His political problems have provided ammunition for critics, such as Murray Bookchin, who regard deep ecology as a reactionary movement. In this essay, I argue that, despite some similarities, Heidegger’s thought and deep ecology are in many ways incompatible, in part because deep ecologists—in spite of their criticism of (...) the ecologically destructive character of technological modernity—generally support a “progressive” idea of human evolution. (shrink)

Deep ecologists have criticized reform environmentalists for not being sufficiently radical in their attempts to curb human exploitation of the nonhuman world. Ecofeminists, however, maintain that deep ecologists, too, are not sufficiently radical, for they have neglected the cmcial role played by patriarchalism in shaping the cultural categories responsible for Western humanity’s domination of Nature. According to eco-feminists, only by replacing those categories-including atomism, hierarchalism, dualism, and androcentrism - can humanity learn to dweIl in harmony with nonhuman beings. After reviewing (...) the eco-feminist critique both of reform environmentalism and of deep ecology, I sketch a critical dialogue between eco-feminism and deep ecology. (shrink)

Ray Kurzweil and others have posited that the confluence of nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics, and genetic engineering will soon produce posthuman beings that will far surpass us in power and intelligence. Just as black holes constitute a ldquo;singularityrdquo; from which no information can escape, posthumans will constitute a ldquo;singularity:rdquo; whose aims and capacities lie beyond our ken. I argue that technological posthumanists, whether wittingly or unwittingly, draw upon the long-standing Christian discourse of ldquo;theosis,rdquo; according to which humans are capable of (...) being God or god-like. From St. Paul and Luther to Hegel and Kurzweil, the idea of human self-deification plays a prominent role. Hegel in particular emphasizes that God becomes wholly actualized only in the process by which humanity achieves absolute consciousness. Kurzweil agrees that God becomes fully actual only through historical processes that illuminate and thus transform the entire universe. The difference is that for Kurzweil and many other posthumanists, our offspringmdash;the posthumansmdash;will carry out this extraordinary process. What will happen to Home sapiens in the meantime is a daunting question. (shrink)

ABSTRACT These are replies to critical discussions by Chrisoula Andreou, Sergio Tenenbaum, and J. David Velleman of my Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. I explain important differences between my appeal to a grounding role of the end of diachronic self-governance and Velleman’s view that ‘intelligibility is [the] constitutive aim of action.’ And I discuss both Velleman’s Quine-inspired conception of norms of plan rationality and his comments on methodology in the philosophy of action. In response to Tenenbaum, I (...) explain how appeal to a planning agent’s self-governance over time supports basic planning norms. And I explain why my appeal to the significance of the end of one’s diachronic self-governance need not lead to unacceptable bootstrapping. In response to Andreou, I explain why, on my view of rational willpower, the agent’s general assessment in favor of a general pattern of action, while common and important, need not play a fundamental role in a planning agent’s sticking with their prior resolution in the face of temptation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The purpose of this article is to review literature that is relevant to the social scientific study of ethics and leadership, as well as outline areas for future study. We first discuss ethical leadership and then draw from emerging research on “dark side” organizational behavior to widen the boundaries of the review to includeunethical leadership. Next, three emerging trends within the organizational behavior literature are proposed for a leadership and ethics research agenda: 1) emotions, 2) fit/congruence, and 3) identity/identification. We (...) believe each shows promise in extending current thinking. The review closes with discussion of important issues that are relevant to the advancement of research on leadership and ethics. (shrink)

The experience of free will has causal consequences, albeit not immediate ones. Although Wegner recognizes this, his model failed to incorporate this causal link. Is this experience central to “what makes us human”? A broad acceptance of Wegner's claim that free will is illusory has significant societal and religious consequences, therefore the threshold of evidence needs to be correspondingly high.

Integral Ecology uses multiple perspectives to analyze environmental problems. Four of Integral Ecology's major analytical perspectives (known as the quadrants) correspond to the four divisions of the liberal arts and sciences: fine arts, natural science, social science, and humanities. Integral Ecology also utilizes the analytical perspective provided by the idea of cultural moral development. This perspective helps to reveal how stakeholders at different developmental stages disclose a phenomenon, in this case, a tropical forest that loggers propose to clear-cut. Integral Ecology (...) takes into account all pertinent perspectives, in order to arrive at the best possible solution to environmental problems and conflicts. (shrink)

In this essay, I address three questions: the nature of heidegger's involvement with national socialism; whether there is an essential link between heidegger's thought and his political decision to support hitler; and allegations regarding anti-Semitism in his thought and politics.

308 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:2 APRIL 1996 cal rereading: Kant's substantial rather than exclusively procedural conception of free- dom and autonomy; the constitutive rather than merely regulative function of pure practical reason; and the latter's cognitive-cum-conative nature. But this should not detract from Neiman's original and provocative work, which deserves widespread attention. GONTER ZOLLER University of Iowa Cyril O'Regan. The Heterodox Hegel. SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press, a994. Pp. xi + (...) 517 . Paper, $94-95. This astonishingly erudite and elegantly written book is a major intellectual achieve- ment. O'Regan's study seeks to defend Hegel's trinitarian onto-theology against its modern and postmodern detractors. In addition to an intimate knowledge of Hegel's own work and commentaries thereon, O'Regan reveals a profound grasp of Christian theology, ranging from patristic authors and.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 155-156 [Access article in PDF] Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xx + 780. Cloth, $39.95. Having already made an important contribution to Hegel scholarship with his book, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, Terry Pinkard has now published an outstanding biography of the great nineteenth century thinker. Pinkard explains extraordinarily well the complicated philosophical (...) and social contexts in which Hegel's philosophy arose and sheds abundant light on Hegel's personality, life, family, and times. This book validates the very idea of the "sociality of reason," by revealing that Hegel's ideas were shaped by his effort both to understand and to influence the contours of a fledgling modernity. Philosophers who may have been put off either by Hegel's philosophy, or else by the obscure rhetoric in which it is often couched, may give Hegel a second chance if they read this rewarding book.The text begins with a detailed account of Hegel's early life and family, including his familial status within the highly stratified society of the duchy of Württenberg. Pinkard's account of late eighteenth century German politics, including the role played by "estates" in social organization, greatly clarifies issues involved in Hegel's effort to reconcile the benefits of local particularism with those of Enlightenment universalism. Pinkard goes on to provide fascinating details about Hegel's life and personality as he traveled the long and frustrating road to a university professorship at Heidelberg, which he did not attain until 1816, when he was forty six. We learn of Hegel's love for good wine, social gatherings, card playing, opera, and theater. It was during a very busy seven year period (1809-1816), when he was rector of a gymnasium in Nuremberg, that Hegel wrote his Logic. The conservative politics, customs, and educational practices of Roman Catholic Bavaria grated on Hegel, who clearly preferred the political progressiveness of his own (thoroughly modernized) version of Lutheranism. Plagued throughout his career by stuttering and other symptoms of nervousness while lecturing, Hegel's fame grew so great in Berlin that his students regarded such symptoms as evidence of the great thinker's struggle with difficult concepts.Pinkard's book also offers an invaluable account of Hegel's relationships—both intellectual and personal, friendly and disputational—with the leading intellectuals of early nineteenth century Germany, including Hölderlin, Fichte, Schelling, Goethe, Schleiermacher, and many others. Pinkard succeeds brilliantly in explaining not only the philosophical debates of the day, including the rise of and resistance to German [End Page 155] idealism, but also how Hegel positioned his own thought in relation to that of his contemporaries. The book recounts complex debates that took place among authors now long forgotten, but who were at the time important, especially to the young Hegel, who was trying to establish himself professionally. Pinkard's excellent summaries of Hegel's major works, ranging from the Phenomenology to the late lectures on religion, reveal how they relate to the philosophical, cultural, social, political, and economic issues of the era. By closely examining Hegel's letters and unpublished works, and by scrutinizing remarks made about him by his contemporaries, Pinkard shows how strongly Hegel yearned to make a difference in the formation of the modern world.In addition to these and many other notable accomplishments, Pinkard's book also examines the various legends connected with Hegel's life. It was a letter written by Hegel himself that helped to establish the myth that while completing the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel could hear the thunder of cannons while Napoleon advanced on Jena. In fact, the book had been substantially completed two weeks earlier (see 228-229). Hegel did in fact father a son out of wedlock, but later formally adopted the boy, who unfortunately never felt fully integrated into the family. Moreover, Hegel's own deeds, not merely his philosophical position in The Philosophy of Right, helped to earn for him the reputation of supporting the conservative views of the Prussian state. For instance, going... (shrink)

This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...) our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. The essays offer extensive discussions of related views by, among others, Donald Davidson, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Christine Korsgaard, Harry Frankfurt, and P. F. Strawson. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students. (shrink)

The Strange Situation procedure was developed by Ainsworth two decades agoas a means of assessing the security of infant-parent attachment. Users of the procedureclaim that it provides a way of determining whether the infant has developed species-appropriate adaptive behavior as a result of rearing in an evolutionary appropriate context, characterized by a sensitively responsive parent. Only when the parent behaves in the sensitive, species-appropriate fashion is the baby said to behave in the adaptive or secure fashion. Furthermore, when infants are (...) observed repeatedly in the Strange Situation,the pattern of behavior is said to be highly similar, and this pattern is said to predict the infants' future behavior in a diverse array of contexts. After an exhaustive review of the literature, it is shown that these popular claims are empirically unsupported in their strong form, and that the interpretations in terms of biological adaptationare misguided. There is little reliable evidence about the specific dimensions of parental behavior that affect Strange Situation behavior, although there does appear to be some relationship between these constructs. Temporal stability in security of attachment ishigh only when there is stability in family and caretaking circumstances. Likewise, patterns of Strange Situation behavior only have substantial predictive validity in similarly stable families. Implications for future research and theorizing — particularly as they relate to the use of evolutionary biology in psychological theory — are discussed. (shrink)

According to the Gottesman–Knill theorem, quantum algorithms that utilize only the operations belonging to a certain restricted set are efficiently simulable classically. Since some of the operations in this set generate entangled states, it is commonly concluded that entanglement is insufficient to enable quantum computers to outperform classical computers. I argue in this article that this conclusion is misleading. First, the statement of the theorem is, on reflection, already evident when we consider Bell’s and related inequalities in the context of (...) a discussion of computational machines. This, in turn, helps us to understand that the appropriate conclusion to draw from the Gottesman–Knill theorem is not that entanglement is insufficient to enable a quantum performance advantage, but rather that if we limit ourselves to the operations referred to in the Gottesman–Knill theorem, we will not have used the resources provided by an entangled quantum system to their full potential. (shrink)

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...) of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

In autonomous action the agent herself directs and governs the action. But what is it for the agent herself to direct and to govern? One theme in a series of articles by Harry G. Frankfurt is that we can make progress in answering this question by appeal to higher-order conative attitudes. Frankfurt's original version of this idea is that in acting of one's own free will, one is not acting simply because one desires so to act. Rather, it is also (...) true that this desire motivates one's action because one desires that this desire motivate one's action. This latter desire about the motivational role of one's desire is a second-order desire. It is, in particular, what Frankfurt calls a second-order “volition.” And, according to Frankfurt's original proposal, acting of one's own free will involves in this way such second-order, and sometimes yet higher order, volitions. (shrink)